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WHAT NEXT?
After October 5th, nothing will be as it was before.  This overly exploited phrase best describes the state we are in
at the moment and applies to the social and economic systems alike.  
After everything that happened, two basic questions arise: 1) What next?  2) How do we achieve it? 
So, what are we to do?  Before we apply therapy of a certain kind, it is necessary to give the right diagnosis.  As
follows, the task is relatively simple:
¥ the GDP is halved as compared to the level in 1989;
¥ industrial production is three times less than in 1989;
¥ the average wage has fallen below 90 DEM;
¥ unemployment surpasses 30%;
¥ foreign debt is larger than the GDP;
¥ foreign trade is minimal;
¥ inflation is striding and the dinar depreciating by the day;
¥ the country is isolated and with no access to international financial organizations...
What are the possible therapies under such circumstances?  Before any economic measures are applied, it is nec-
essary to bring people and institutions back to a normal course. Chaos and irregularity are becoming basic characteris-
tics of the state we are in, threatening great achievements in the September elections.  Thus, the reestablishment of legal-
ity is a conditio sine qua non.  Unfortunately, at this moment, legal and executive rule does not function at either the
federal or republic level.  Each lost day brings new problems, and there is no time to lose.
There is a great readiness among foreigners for investing in our country in the near-term. Meanwhile, substantial
assistance from abroad has been announced, for the time being on a bilateral basis.  The reasons are manifold:
What are the possible therapies under such circumstances?  Before any economic measures are applied, it is nec-
essary to bring people and institutions back to a normal course. Chaos and irregularity are becoming basic characteris-
tics of the state we are in, threatening great achievements in the September elections.  Thus, the reestablishment of legal-
ity is a conditio sine qua non.  Unfortunately, at this moment, legal and executive rule does not function at either the
federal or republic level.  Each lost day brings new problems, and there is no time to lose.
There is a great readiness among foreigners for investing in our country in the near-term. Meanwhile, substantial
assistance from abroad has been announced, for the time being on a bilateral basis.  The reasons are manifold:
FRY a) 1999 1999 VIII 2000 VIII 2000 VIII 2000 I-VIII 2000
Basic Economic Indicators 1998 VII 2000 VIII 1999 I-VIII 1999
Industrial Production É -24.1% É 5.3% 20.6% 20.6%
Montenegro É -7.6% É -14.5% -4.5% 0.3%
Serbia É -25.6% É 7.0% 22.5% 22.0%
Central Serbia É -24.5% É 4.3% 20.0% 23.7%
Vojvodina É -28.2% É 13.1% 29.0% 17.9%
Average Wage - DM 107 -31.7% É É É É
Montenegro 154 -14.1% 197 3.1% 24.4% 11.0%
Serbia 102 -33.8% 90 -2.5% -9.3% -22.9%
Unemployment Rate b) 27.3% 8.3% 28.6% É É É
Montenegro 36.8% 7.9% 40.6% É É É
Serbia 26.5% 8.2% 27.6% É É É
Export - USD million 1,498 -46.9% 136 -13.7% 30.1% 17.8%
Montenegro 123 -4.7% 6.9 -55.0% -33.5% 41.3%
Serbia 1,375 -48.9% 129 -9.3% 37.1% 15.5%
Import - USD million 3,296 -30.3% 250 -10.7% 0.2% 29.7%
Montenegro 358 6.9% 19 -21.9% -15.7% 2.6%
Serbia 2,938 -33.2% 231 -9.7% 1.8% 33.4%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, DIN billion 16.4 51.9% 23.7 5.3% 71.7% 58.2%
Cash 6.7 34.0% 8.3 3.7% 55.1% 33.1%
Deposits 9.7 67.2% 15.4 6.2% 82.3% 75.9%
Real money supply, end of period, DM million 739 -42.3% 816 -2.6% -21.9% -35.8%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 4.25% -38.8% 6.52% 3.0% 147.9% 34.3%
Retail prices c) É 42.4% É 5.4% 71.1% 60.3%
Montenegro É 60.1% É ... ... ...
Serbia É 41.1% É 4.7% 64.5% 54.9%
Cost of living É 44.9% É 9.4% 83.4% 68.5%
Montenegro É 67.2% É ... ... ...
Serbia É 43.5% É 9.1% 76.6% 62.5%
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12.6 88.1% 26.7 12.6% 120.2% 123.4%
a) GDP for 1999 was 14,224 million USD, GDP per capita was 1,699 USD, GDP annual growth rate in 1999 was 19.3%, GDP annual growth per capita in 1999 was -19.1% (G17
estimate based on official data of the Federal Statistics Bureau)
b)  Unemployment rate refers to July.
c)  Producer prices in 1999/1998 are up: for FRY 44.2%, Montenegro 63.7%, and Serbia 43.2%.
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¥ the Yugoslav area was the largest hotbed in Europe during the past decade, carrying a constant danger of new
military conflicts.  By bringing their capital, foreign investors will sustain and strengthen democratic forces and prevent
the return of retrograde formations;
¥ the Yugoslav market is attractive because of an exceptional lack of capital and high profit rates that can be
acquired under such conditions.  Apart from that, this area is interesting for productive investments since goods can eas-
ily be distributed on neighboring markets;
¥ low standards of personal consumption have been established due to prolonged isolation, and there is great
demand for higher quality products.  This is as encouraging for imports as it is for the production of higher quality goods
at home;
¥ finally, foreign investors, especially from countries directly involved in last year’s bombing, may feel the need to
pacify the conscience of their nations for destroying Serbia by investing capital.
Announcements of substantial investments have already arrived from Norway, Italy, Germany, Czech, France and
several other countries, as well as from the EU — making its first move on October 9 by lifting most sanctions.  The inter-
national community thus offered unmistakable support beyond mere words for the democratization process.   
The decisive step towards total transformation in Serbia was taken in the elections and during the defense of elec-
tion results.   That was, however, a necessary but insufficient condition for the expected overall social and economic
transformation.  Achieving that goal requires undertaking a huge job by the whole nation.  The G17 PLUS Program,
drawn up for the Democratic Opposition of Serbia before the election campaign, is completely operational and relies
on realistic foundations, with no politicized or exhilarated promises.  
Before the ProgramÕs realization begins, it is necessary to establish legislative and executive authority in the whole
territory of the country.  This implies urgent constitution of transitional governments at the federal and republican level.
Problems have already surged that delay the choice for premier and government representatives.  Because of political
opportunism it is not certain whether the governments will be expert or political.  If this situation lasts, there is serious
danger that the strongly proclaimed process of economic recovery and social transformation will stagnate.  The unset-
tled situation has negative influence on foreign investors and there is a possibility that their enthusiasm for investing
might slacken.  At this moment Serbia is a sensation in the media and in every other sense, due to the way in which
the regime was overthrown.  High consciousness, the decisiveness of people in protecting their will, and the small num-
ber of casualties during the changes influenced a turn of public opinion in all countries of the world.  Now is the moment
to take advantage of the readiness of foreigners to invest in our country.  Once news from Serbia moves away from the
front pages of newspapers, the positive charge will ease, giving way to indifference.  Therefore, the normalization of
economic flows and the creation of a positive environment for foreign investments are of the utmost importance.  
Immediately following nominations for the federal and republican governments, activities for redefining relations
with Montenegro must take place.  It is necessary to adopt a declaration on urgent preparations for passing a new con-
stitution.  Laws with harmful consequences must be suspended, such as the laws on information, the university, on the
expropriation of uncultivated land from farmers, presidential privileges, etc.
Simultaneously, it is essential to return dignity and respect to the work of civil servants, ministers and government
officials.  Skilled and honorable people should be chosen, and their property should be made known to the public.
Thus important functions will be open to public scrutiny and the credibility of officials restored.
The first ambitious task of the new federal government will be to adopt a package of reform laws, to be rec-
onciled with European Union standards.  This relates to laws for conducting monetary reforms and the beginning
of fiscal reforms, an anti-corruption law, legislation on the military and police, on courts and judges, on public pros-
ecution, on criminal law and criminal proceedings, on public information, on the university, on local governance,
and a package of electoral laws. 
Thereby, favorable conditions will be set for a return of Yugoslavia and Serbia to the world. The regulation of
our status in the UN and the International Monetary Fund will have crucial significance.  By insisting upon the con-
tinuity of Yugoslavia, the former regime was denied access to the most powerful international financial organization,
automatically shutting Yugoslavia out of all other international financial institutions.  Instead of headstrong insistence
upon continuity, regardless of the validity of arguments, it would be more rational to apply for reception at the Fund
under conditions that the former Yugoslav republics had to fulfill.  After regaining our membership in the Fund, seri-
ous negotiations could commence with the Paris and London Clubs, our largest trustees, for regulating the existing
foreign debt and obtaining new loans.  
The next major step relates to establishing an economic system that allows a long-term balance of the state budget.
In order to achieve this, it is necessary to increase revenue by decreasing taxes and widening the fiscal base, on one
hand, and to decrease budget expenditure on the other.  Major reforms of the tax system and an introduction of the
value-added tax (VAT), which exists in most European countries, are especially important.  
Parallel to fiscal reforms, it is necessary to perform a complete reconstruction of the monetary system.  Two possi-
bilities for achieving a stable currency are being considered: 1) introducing a dual currency system, and 2) issuing a new
domestic convertible currency.  Although the first might seem as the simpler solution, easily attainable and already test-
ed in practice, the second possibility is more favorable in the long term.  Any serious country, and Yugoslavia certainly
has such pretensions, must have its own currency as one of the symbols of national and state sovereignty.  The imple-
mentation of such a concept requires substantial foreign currency reserves for defending convertibility.  Existing reserves
of 400 million dollars represent a solid base, but additional means should be sought abroad.  A special fund could be
formed to that end ("fund for defending convertibility") based on a loan from foreign countries that intend to support
economic transformation.  Means would be collected without interest, for a fixed time period - until total convertibility
is achieved, then returned to trustees.  The most probable solution for this would be a bilateral arrangement with coun-
tries that are showing great readiness to support early reforms.
Price liberalization is the next important field that requires commitment from the new federal government.  It is
unavoidable if our goal is to achieve a market economy, but it also represents the first great danger for the creators of
a new economic policy.  The best way would be to opt for a gradual liberalization of prices, along with subsidizing the
poor in order to avoid social discontent.
Finally, the inevitable topic: privatization.  Halfway, inconsistent and non-mandatory solutions from previous prac-
tice influenced the slow management of privatization so far.  Acquired experience clearly shows that privatization should
be performed quickly, in an obligatory and transparent way.   
If the creators of new economic policy are to be independent enough to break from political influence and party
pressures, prospects for complete recovery will be good.  Contrary to which an economic system similar to the one
before will be formed, and the discontent of citizens will be evident once again in the next elections.  However, the
price that was paid to achieve our current position was too large, politicians should not be allowed to put this chance
at stake.  We will probably never have such a chance again. 
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ORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCIAL MARKET
The state in which the reform government will take over the country and its economy impos-
es the task of urgent activities along several lines.  Among others, two primary goals are: privati-
zation and the regulation of monetary conditions, which bring to the foreground the financial
market, its institutions, and the regulation of management within it.
Threefold significance
First, the success of privatization depends especially on a regulated environment of imple-
mentation for the following reasons: 
1. Investors want a regulated business environment.  Opening the country to direct foreign
investment is a necessary move for collecting means that would serve to implement
reforms and establish a special fund for stabilization.  Many domestic companies will be
privatized through public tender by strategic investors and partners.
However, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME’s), being a particularly important part
of economy because of their vitality and mobility, are not always interesting for this kind
of privatization.  Therefore, other models should be applied for privatizing these compa-
nies.  Regardless of whether "small" or big investors - strategic partners or investment
funds from abroad are considered, their rights should be protected and their activities
secured through institutions of the financial market;
2. Privatization without institutions ends in misconduct and corruption.  The absence of insti-
tutions, their weakness or insufficient activity on surveys and regulation of the market, and
above all, on providing transparency, contribute to misconduct during privatization, the
artificial reduction of company price and usurpation of ownership by the most apt manip-
ulators, rather than of highly skilled managers of capital.  Examples in Czech, Slovakia,
Croatia and Russia support this argument;   
3. The lack of institutions disables progress toward an additional quality of privatization:
change of the social milieu and support to creating a civil society.  The SME segment is a
framework for forming an independent middle class, which is, in turn, the basis of civil
society.  The middle class has almost disappeared from our social milieu during the past
ten years, and without its reestablishment and growth there can be no development of an
open democratic society;
4. Without institutions it is impossible to achieve a central quality of stockholding: an increase
of efficiency in economy by capital mobility and fast reactions to market fluctuations.
Stockholding in itself loses significance for an economy if it does not allow simple and
prompt changes of property through financial market institutions. Thus, stockholding
enables fast shifting of capital, and, consequently, achieving balance on the market.    
Secondly, an organized foreign currency market will legalize foreign currency trade, while
also providing instruments for protection against currency risk and defending the stability of
domestic currency through futures foreign currency trade.  
The example of the Budapest commodity (futures) stock market shows that the existence of
possibilities for protection against currency risk is one of the decisive criteria of foreign investors
when entering a foreign market.  Its fast success is mainly based on this kind of organized pro-
tection by means of futures foreign currency contracts.
On the other hand, the example of Montenegro serves to illustrate the negative consequences of
omitting the organization of such protection - its market still has both dinars and German marks in
circulation, but there is no instrument that provides protection from currency risk.  Like instruments
- foreign currency bonds, dinar/mark futures contracts - would provide for the fast withdrawal of sur-
plus marks (or dinars) from the market, so as to avoid a rise of prices in marks, for example. 
Third, inflationary pressure caused by financing primary agricultural production can in many
ways be mitigated, even removed in great measure, by futures trade instruments.  One of the most
important causes of the catastrophic state in agriculture is bad production stimulation and pro-
duction financing.  Guaranteed state purchases of wheat could not solve anything: apart from not
receiving the promised price, producers were paid amounts sufficient enough to cause inflation-
ary "wheat" blows.  Futures trade in primary agricultural products distributes the burden of financ-
ing evenly throughout the year through financial market instruments.  
SME development
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The futility of existing institutions
Some institutions through which financial market organization could be conducted exist even
now.  These are the commission for securities, the stock market, and brokers.  They, however,
remain beyond essential market flows.  They are experiencing what all other economic and social
institutions experienced: real life goes past them.
Deinstitutionalization here denotes relocation of the decision-making process outside the insti-
tutional structure, where institutions themselves become unsubstantial and useless.  Everything is
relocated beyond institutions and their rules, regardless of how these very rules are futile and
wrong.  Therefore it cannot be said that there exists any system, any complete technological
whole, of any kind in Serbia.  Moreover, we are facing remains of a personal/family regime that
cannot function without incentive from a single center of power.  Thus the extensive dysfunction
and inefficiency — no one dares take the initiative for solving least significant matters without per-
mission.  
Lacking systematic action through institutions, each decision is passed for itself, with no con-
tinuity, no reliance on rules and standards, and no possibility for experience-based planning.
From there derives so much insecurity in conducting business, hence the reduction of planning
horizons and business horizons to periods that are shorter than a month.  All this is especially
lethal for the financial market, which relies upon security, institutionalized trust, and transparen-
cy in its organized form.
The Securities’ Commission
Formed as a federal agency, the Securities’ Commission presently functions only on the terri-
tory of the larger federal unit.  This is a direct consequence of its central determinant, party and
political affiliation.  Like all other state bodies, it was marked by the former political coalition in
its rules and in relations that governed therein.  Thus the latent conflict of the Commission vs.
the Ministry for Property Transformation, that impeded attempts for the placement of stock from
privatization performed so far.
Privatization is also marked in the same way, so it is more justified to talk of transforming
social into party property, rather than social to private.  The basic unit for implementing privati-
zation is the company, which is controlled by management appointed by the political nomencla-
ture.  Inconsistent with the nominal intent of the law, management consistently retains control
over firms, by using institutions vaguely defined by law.  Before they become stock companies,
firms confine themselves to a form of closed partnership societies controlled by "party" people.  
Stockholding has also become an empty shell.  Rarely can a right of stock be exercised - div-
idends are not paid, access to administrative boards is determined by political affiliation rather
than property, societies confound business data and hardly ever publicize them.  Stockholding
has thus been almost completely repudiated, due to the lack of real protection of ownership
rights’ and regardless of the form of privatization - strategic investment, as in the case of ICN and
"Galenika," or small stockholders.  Hence it does not surprise that there is no trade in stocks —
there is no motive since they are deprived of their very essence.
Obviously, much work lies ahead for the Securities’ Commission, which is expected to embark
upon serious activity.  New regulations have to direct activities of the commission to: the protec-
tion of investors and stock market control, denoting transparency to the largest possible degree,
and promotion of the financial market and stockholding.  Also, the Securities’ Commission should
take over futures’ trade regulation, i.e. trade with futures’ contracts.  Regulation itself, however,
is not sufficient.  It is crucial that bodies like the Securities’ Commission be defined in expert
rather than political terms.         
Securities’ registers
Property rights’ protection is technically, and essentially, hardly feasible without a securities’
register.  There is no like institution on our market so far.  In its establishment, however, anoth-
er comparative advantage with regard to other transition markets should be kept in mind - the
existence of a Payment Service network.  The Montenegrin project for a privatization register is
also shaped by this fact, as well as the present legal project for a central register.  The Payment
Service network would enable efficient transfer of property, and control of the same, on the state
level, proceeded by a dematerialization of securities.  However, it would be wrong to permit
direct trade through this kind of network.  In Czech and Slovakia, direct trade through a similar
network - the RMS, lacking financial market regulations and institutions, led to extensive manip-
ulation with voucher and stock prices.    
The securities’ register must be the subject of new regulations, in the first round of reforms.
Without them we will have a situation similar to that in Russia, where stockholders’ books are
kept arbitrarily and there is no possibility to control or protect stockholders’ rights.  Such condi-
tions will not attract many investors.
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Funds
Apart from a securities’ register, this market is also unfamiliar with investment funds.  There
existed brokers’ agencies that tried to function like privatization funds during the process, but
were disabled by the commission.  Funds are, therefore, another subject that should be defined
by new regulations.  Their function of concentrating free small capital is all the more significant
when we consider the total lack of organized savings in our country.
The stock market
The stock market has been facing a systematic problem since it was formed - a conflict of sta-
tus (founders) and function (mediation).  As opposed to the usual way of forming stock markets
by associating mediators, current positive regulation does not allow mediators to be founders of
the stock market.  Banks are the largest founders of the stock market, where half the administra-
tive board consists of representatives of the largest banking group in the country, which covers
60% of the financial market.  Thus a paradoxical combination: stock market and monopoly.  The
stock market functioned as an administrative body during most of the decade of its existence, one
that communicated by official correspondence and statements with parties who had to be stimu-
lated for business.  Recent attempts to change something on this relation are facing a whole series
of problems, which derive from the simple fact that the existing non-market environment does
not support the stock market as a market institution.  
New regulations should resolve this constellation and place it on healthier foundations.  The
stock market consists of a whole scheme of relations between itself and stockbrokers, so that their
access to conducting business policy on the stock market is necessary.  In a certain transitional
period the existing founders could be authorized to transfer stock, i.e. sell it to stock market deal-
ers.  Through that kind of network, and in direct cooperation with it, a connection between the
stock market and market could be established, where the stock market is one of the market’s focal
points.  Only then could the existing situation be overcome, where there are technical conditions
for securities’ trade on the stock market, but those who should be dealing are unconcerned and
do not have what to trade with, except for short-term securities.   
The dealers’ network itself should also be adapted to an organized financial market.  Now it
conforms to the existing situation where there is trade only with short-term corporate debt secu-
rities.  Out of fifty brokerage houses, half are inactive, a major part of the other half relates its
activities to a few companies, being a kind of internal broker, while some ten houses try to devel-
op their activities in full compliance with the circumstances.  Adapting the brokerage network
would refer, above all, to a separation of contracting deals from their execution, therefore, to the
formation of a double level of mediation between the stock market and market, where security
of financial market transactions would be raised.  
Responsibility for security in business transactions should be shifted to brokers as well, or
their associations that should be organized as lawyers’ or doctors’ chambers.  Self-regulation
proved to be the most efficient means for preserving basic professional standards.  The existing
form of a business association of brokerage houses is superfluous.  The stock market should be
the business association of brokerage houses.  
Regional cooperation
In the forthcoming period all mentioned institutions, especially the securities’ commission and
stock market, should develop another dimension of activity: regional cooperation.  The Southeast
European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) has made considerable progress in this sense.  Regional
stock markets have been trying to set the foundations of mutual cooperation at regular meetings
for some time now.  The final goal is to form a regional electronic stock market, and it is moti-
vated by awareness that all national markets in the Balkans are too shallow to support develop-
ment of larger, top-quality firms.  
Achieving the goal would first require mutual exchange of brokerage houses’ members,
regional listings’ and exchange contracts’ standards.  Hence a listing of top-quality companies in
the region would be derived, while national stock market listings would serve as preparation for
regional listing - similar to the relation formerly established between NYSE, as the larger, and
AMEX as the smaller stock market.  Conditions would be set for retaining securities of major com-
panies in the region for the longest possible time, instead of previous large leaps of the Hungarian
telekom, or "Pliva" pharmaceuticals, the stock of which shifted to large world stock markets as
soon as they outgrew limits of narrow domestic markets. 
Finally, the Bucharest commodity stock market, immediately followed by the one in Budapest,
initiated development of cooperation between commodity (futures) stock markets in countries of
the Danubian flow in 1994.  The basic goal of this cooperation was to form regional standards
for futures trade in grain, under the rightful assumption that in financing agricultural production,
the defense of prices and placement of goods can more easily be provided through a wider base.
The lifting of sanctions will open possibilities for our inclusion into this initiative, which should
by no means be overlooked.
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MACROECONOMIC REVIEW
The pace of political and economic changes has been very hard to follow during the past month.
At the risk of being late with regard to the outcome of events, the macroeconomic review will be
consistent in commenting upon the economic circumstances that preceded these events and repre-
sented a good landmark for the favorable political turnout.  
Prices, the exchange rate, wages
Former experience with political cycles in Serbia distinctly shows the occurrence of a real
increase in wages precedes elections.  This happened both in 1996 and 1997.  However, the real
decrease of wages in August is insignificant, from 92 to 90 DEM, while pensions mark a real drop
as compared to July (from 77 to 68 DEM).  This is the first time that the former regime could not
manage to raise real wages before the elections. The graph clearly shows a divergence of real wages
fluctuations expressed in DEM and in real dinars calculated through deflation by living cost indices.
This partly absurd situation can be explained by an expansive monetary policy and price control.
We have pointed to the inadequate survey of prices several times, and to the fact that 60% of prices
are under direct or indirect government control.  In this way, disguised or suppressed inflation
makes the stagnation of real dinar wages the least credible.  The effects of directed economic policy
and exaggerated state interventionism could not remain subdued, thus disabling theretofore use of
an increase of population income as a pre-election trick.
It is interesting to note, for the first time in several months, a larger increase of officially stated
price and living cost indices in August as compared to the month before. Retail prices rose by 5.4%
in the FRY, and by 4.7% in Serbia this month.  The growth of living costs was almost twice the
growth of retail prices this month, amounting to 9.4% in FRY, and 9.1% in Serbia.  Real fluctuations
are increasingly hindering manipulations with statistical data, demonstrating that economy is already
surpassing monthly inflation rate intervals of 5 to 6%, thus reaching an annual rate of around 100%.
As compared to the previous month, when living cost growth amounted to 3.2%, the growth in
August is three times as large.
The official annual inflation rate (August 1999-August 2000) has reached the level of 64.5% for
retail prices, and 76.6% for living costs.  For the period of January-August 1999, retail prices in Serbia
this year are up by 54.9%, and living costs by 62.5%.
The effects of a 6.7% increase of money in circulation in July started to show in August.  The
giro exchange rate did not change significantly, which is logical because there was no increase of
deposit money in July, while the August increase had not yet reflected.  
After the elections were scheduled, relative stability of the black market exchange rate, main-
tained by changing the structure of M1, started slackening, followed by dramatic exchange rate fluc-
tuations.  The average black market exchange rate to the DEM was 12.7% larger in August than in
July, maintaining the same trend in September.  An attempt was made to maintain the level from
August until several days before the elections, when a further rise of the DEM exchange rate took
place and reached a level 52% greater than in July.  It seemed as though a level was reached where
changes in M1 almost immediately reflected upon exchange rate and price fluctuations.  Miloäevi
had entered pre-election silence with a hint of chaos on the foreign currency market and inflation
that was escaping control.
Industrial production
The period of recession that began in 1998 is continuing, although monthly indices are impres-
sive at first sight.  In August, the FRY marks industrial production growth of 5.3% with relation to
July.  In Serbia, production grew by 7%, while it fell by 14.5% in Montenegro.  Production increased
in 23 sectors, ranging from 1% (oil and gas) to 92.7% (non-metals).  Eleven sectors mark a decrease,
ranging from 0.7% in yarn and fabric production, to 56.5% in rubber processing.  
The deseasoned index for August
paints a slightly different picture (1999
average=100), marking a fall of 0.6% rela-
tive to July.  After growth in the first four
months of this year, the index is stagnating
and holding at a level of around 120%.
Compared to August last year, industrial
production grew by 20.6% in FRY, and by
22.5% in Serbia.  Industrial production in
August 2000 was down 65.6% relative to
August 1989.   
August 2000 marks a fall of production
year-on-year in nine sectors: iron ore pro-
duction 21.2%, fodder production 11.2%,
rubber processing 9.9%, production of
beverages 2.9%, final wood products man-
ufacture 2.7%, shipbuilding 1.8%, food
production 1.3%.  All other sectors record
growth ranging from 0.9% in yarn and tex-
tile production, to 785.6% in oil deriva-
tivesÕ production.  The latter is the most
obvious example of increase determined
by a low base.  Almost all capacities for oil
derivativesÕ production were destroyed
during the bombing, so that very little in
the way of oil derivatives were produced
in August of last year.
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Foreign trade
Total foreign trade in August in the FRY amounted to 386 million USD.  Exports accounted for
136 million USD, and imports for 250 million USD.  Serbia exported goods worth 129 million USD,
and imported 231 million USD worth.  The degree of import by export coverage in August was
54.4% for FRY, and 55.8% for Serbia, while in July it was over 60%.  The reason for this fall was
a 13.7% decrease of FRY exports during that period.
In the first eight months of this year FRY exports were worth 1,009 million USD, while imports
were 2,237 million USD worth.  The
deficit was larger than exports and
amounted to 1,228 million USD, so that
there was only 45.1% coverage of imports
by exports.  Compared to the first eight
months of 1999, exports are up by 17.8%,
and imports by 29.7%.  The situation is
much better when we compare it to that
in August 1999.  Exports are up by 30.7%,
while imports are almost steady (0.2%
growth).  The increase of exports is not a
result of improved performance in econ-
omy, but of a low basis from August last
year when wartime consequences had
much greater impact than today.  
Our main export partners in this peri-
od were Bosnia and Herzegovina (15%),
Macedonia (13%), Italy (12%), Germany
(11%), and Russia (6%).  Our imports
came from Germany (14%), Italy (11%),
Russia (10%), Bulgaria (9%), and Bosnia
and Herzegovina (4%).  The FRY has a
positive balance in foreign trade only
with Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We have
the largest deficit in trade with Germany -
198 million USD, followed by Russia - 159
million USD.  Crude oil and natural gas comprise more than one third of imports from Russia (80
out of 221 million USD).  The import of oil from Russia was both in the last year, and in the year
before, considerably down from 1998 volume and earlier.  Capacities for oil processing were
destroyed during the NATO bombing, so that now oil derivatives are imported instead of crude
oil.  Still, during the past four years, imports of oil and gas from Russia amounted to 1.078 billion
USD, while total exports to Russia amounted to only 577 million USD, so that the difference will
have to appear somewhere.  
The situation in this field also had implications in the pre-election period.  In isolated condi-
tions, Miloäevi needed to declare someone as our potentially most significant foreign trade part-
ner in the election campaign.  We can observe two conflicting tendencies with regard to this issue.
On one hand, an agreement on free trade was signed in August and a commodity credit for the
Electric Power System was approved.  On the other hand, gas deliveries from Russia ceased this
year, due to our inability to respond to past obligations.  Providing easy access to Serbian com-
panies is most certainly Russia’s interest, in order to be able to collect claims as quickly as possi-
ble.  But even though the signed agreement was used in the election campaign, it is essentially
aimed at a faster settlement of debts rather than support for Miloäevi.  Access to most Serbian
companies is still confined, so that payments will have to take on other forms in the future.
However, a different issue altogether had a much more significant role in the election campaign.
The existing fluctuations of the price of oil on the world market favor Russia.  Since the fluctua-
tions were anticipated as such at the beginning of the year, they led to assumptions that Russia
would have a better negotiating position towards Western countries, and that it would easily
approve favorable conditions for exports of oil and gas to Yugoslavia.  The point is that the for-
mer Yugoslav regime never received this kind of "essential" assistance from abroad and had to
face a shortage of oil derivatives that it was not able to solve.
Monetary policy
The long-term effects of badly conducted economic policy, and the country’s surroundings in
general, made the implementation of usual pre-electoral moves impossible.  The money mass
increased by an additional 1.2 billion dinars during August, amounting to 23.7 billion dinars.
Since May of this year, M 1 cumulatively increased by 5 billion dinars.  Apart from exceptional
nominal growth, the real money mass remained at approximately the same level of 816 million
DEM, as related to 838 million in July that were calculated on the basis of the exchange rate pon-
dered to the money mass structure.  Demonetization, or the shortage of real dinars, remains char-
acteristic in Serbian economy.  
Enormous growth of nominal money mass could be observed in previous pre-election peri-
ods as well.  It was different this time, however.  Previous elections were conducted in more
favorable macroeconomic circumstances and the state was able to maintain relative stability in
that period (formerly the sale of Telekom in the election year).  Under conditions of a stable
exchange rate, nominal changes automatically reflected on the real money mass as well.  The sit-
uation this time was completely different, so that the usual debt payment in the pre-election peri-
od and the attempt to incite economic activity by reconstruction resulted in a high degree of insta-
bility in the money sector, instability enhanced by the lack of control over business banks.
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